The first 911 call was at 10:29 a.m. for Piedra Morada Drive residents in Pacific Palisades. In the strong wind, a fire could be seen in the distance, and the flames flashed on the ridges of the feet.
About 11 minutes later, the Los Angeles Fire Department engine 23 was broadcast to dispatch:
“We’re on Palisades Drive. We’ve passed Piedra Morada. We’re still heading to where the fire shows.”

A firefighter sprays water on a burning house on the Pacific Coast expressway in Malibu.
(Wally Skalij/Los Angeles Times)
According to the LAFD incident log obtained by the Times, it will be more than 18 minutes after the 911 call before the engine 23 or any other firefighter arrives at the scene.
Travel time is particularly critical because LAFD officials have decided not to pre-industry engine pre-department Like the firefighters of the past, just like the past, despite warnings The most dangerous wind In recent years, the region has traveled to the region.
In online alertsthe National Weather Service highlights Palisades, the San Fernando Valley and Hollywood, one of the areas of “biggest concern” for the expected storm and the extraordinary fire hazards it will bring.

A firefighter tried to put out a portion of the Pacific Palisade fire that threatened a building near Sunset Boulevard on January 7.
(Genaro Molina / Los Angeles Times)
Several former senior officials of the department told The Times that LAFD may send at least 10 engines to Palisades – several former senior officials of the department told The Times Times, an engine that may patrol the hillsides and canyons.
The former official said crew members of the engines may have discovered the fire shortly after the fire, when it was still small enough to give them a chance to control it.
Instead, according to publicly available information, the crew closest to the fire is on TV 23 and 69, both on Sunset Avenue, about three to four from the Piedra Morada address on the street map. mile.
When they arrived at the station to reach the engine in the fire area, the flames began a eventually unstoppable march, eventually destroying nearly 7,000 homes and other buildings and killing at least 12.
LAFD head Kristin Crowley did not respond to an interview request for the story. More than a month after the fire, she did not answer questions in the New York Times about the engine or engine’s first response, when the helicopter began dripping water on the flame, and other questions.
The office of Mayor Karen Bass also did not respond to Times’ request that the city release a request to record LAFD operations early in the fire.

On January 7, the Palisades Fire threatened a building on Sunset Avenue.
(Genaro Molina / Los Angeles Times)
A total of 18 firefighters responded to the emergency on TV stations 23 and 69. Several former chiefs of Ravder told the Times that there are usually only 14 that can be used to strike a brush fire. The other four were assigned to ambulances at both sites, although they might help with evacuation or rescue during the fire.
The Palisade fire losses may not be that bad if the extra engine is pre-positioned to the most prone areas.
They also noted that LAFD officials expected significantly fewer engines in the city on January 7 than responded Warnings from previous yearsincluding 2011, 2013 and 2019.
With horrible wind forecasts and a winter when there is almost no rain, no one knows where the fire is about to break out, it just can happen and spread quickly. However, the Palisades area meets a large number of pre-departmental department standards for the department, as its stations face longer response times and longer response times to brushes.

On January 8, the Pacific Coast Expressway in Malibu provides structural protection for seashore houses.
(Brian van der Brug / Los Angeles Times)
If there is an engine to patrol along the hills, they said the commander may instruct firefighters to monitor the area where the fire ends up. The former chief said that six days ago, on New Year’s Day, a small fire was put out there, but could have left the slumbered embers hidden in the bushes.
LAFD and federal investigations of alcohol, tobacco, guns and explosives are checking, among other possibilities, whether the fires caused on January 7.
Former LAFD Assistant. Patrick Butler, the current head of the Redondo Beach Fire Department, said that within weeks of the initial fire was knocked down, Bonparal could burn underground. He said he had to deal with invisible embers about a week after the 2019 Getty Fire, for which he served as LAFD commander.

Former LAFD Assistant. Patrick Butler, who is now head of the Redondo Beach Fire Department. He oversaw the preparations for many high-speed events in LAFD and allocated additional engines to prone areas.
(Los Angeles Fire Department)
Butler said reburning was “a very common phenomenon.”
Butler said the fire had occurred and most of the surrounding vegetation had been burned. But after a fire as big as January 1, he said: “Re-burning is easy to grow under the right conditions, such as strong winds.”
Butler and several other former officials say the fire is always more challenging to fight in strong winds, but pre-deployed engines can allow crews to flank the fires to “stay thin” – firefighters’ words that herald prevents them from spreading Side attack – while other rigs attack the head of the head that helps (if any) on the helicopter can cause flames from a safe distance.
They said the engines of other pre-engines could protect the house on the direct roads of the fire.
Instead, according to dispatch records, radio transmissions and interviews, the apparently 69th Engine 23 and crew were obviously in the initial response to the fire. The engines of LAFD radios in Brentwood and Venice responded, but that wasn’t enough, the transmission indicated.
Without strategically placed reinforcements, there was little engine and little prospect to implement the LAFD’s brush fire strategy – hitting it violently and quickly.

Chula Vista firefighters have been paying attention to the Palisades fire after falling in Mandeville Canyon in Brentwood on January 11.
(Genaro Molina / Los Angeles Times)
said former Rick Crawford. U.S. Capitol. “The firefighters did a great job given that they were handed over. … They just didn’t have time to adopt normal tactics.”
Perry Vermillion retired after 33 years at the Los Angeles County Fire Department.
“If you don’t fight hard in the first place, it’s over,” said Zhu Yiniang, who fought in the Malibu area near Palised.
Vermillion said the LAFD should stage engines at several points in Palisades and keep their movement and surveillance before the storm hits.
“You drive around,” he said. “You drive up the hill and learn about the area. You’re patrolling. You send a few strike teams here or there, and then you hang out in the park. You move them to all the different places, So they are close to the brush.”
Shortly after the fire, in order to defend the department’s decision not to order a large number of pre-department deployments, Crowley accused the budget cuts and backlog of engines for repairs. But the Times reported that the department had enough working engines to send dozens of additional rigs to Palisade and elsewhere.

Los Angeles Mayor Karen Bass, left, Los Angeles Fire Chief Kristin Crowley and Los Angeles Police Chief Jim McDonnell, in the January 11th News Speech to the media at the press conference.
(Allen J. Schaben/Los Angeles Times)
Crowley and her staff have not answered Times’ questions about which engines are not available on the day of the fire and the types of repairs required.
Richard Fields, deputy prime minister of LAFD, who is responsible for preparing for a life-threatening storm, told the Times that the engines were powered in the early hours of January 7 and none of them were sent to Palisade Palisades – Enough. Officials decided to take nine engines to Hollywood and the San Fernando Valley the day before. They said they added more content on the morning of January 7 to cover northeast Los Angeles, but the specific numbers and times of the day were not clear in interviews with officials.
Jason Hing, the chief deputy of the emergency operation, acknowledged that pre-deployed engines were not enough, but argued that more engines would not have an impact on the fierce fire.
According to the incident log obtained by the Times, nine pre-designed engines were finally dispatched at noon. By then, the fire had moved out of the house.

On January 10, the Palisades fire spread to Encino through Mandeville Canyon.
(Jason Armond/Los Angeles Times)
The department also decided not to order about 1,000 firefighters to end their shifts earlier on January 7 in order to continue as employees retaining engines and performing other tasks, the Times reported. By directing this extra staff and pulling other engines from all over the city, the LAFD could have sent at least 10 rigs to each of the city’s five outdoor corridors, including Palisade, the former chief said.
Without this or similar backups, one or both engines of Engine 23 and 69 cut their work for them.
Radio Traffic said that as Engine 23 passes Piedra Morada, staff were asked to assess the threat to the house once they watched the fire. They were told that twenty engines were on the way.
One voice said: “Once we get there, if we have any direct impact on the structure and what you need, please tell me what we look like.”
A helicopter first investigated the situation above.

On January 8, a firefighter fought the Palisades fire as the house burned on Malibu’s Pacific Coast Expressway.
(Wally Skalij/Los Angeles Times)
“It pushes directly to Palisades,” someone broadcasts from the sky. “This could potentially cover 200 acres in the next 20 minutes. The structure you may be threatened within 20 minutes has an impact.”
Firefighters on the ground then weighed. “Thirty acres of medium to heavy brush burned towards the ocean,” said one crew member. “Let all companies come.”
The crew reported that the burning embers had flown half a mile and three quarters of a mile before the main fire. Within an hour of the first 911 call, the house began to burn.
Terry Fahn lost his home in the fire and expected firefighters to rise up the hill ahead of schedule, burning the same area given the violent wind forecast and the New Year’s Day brush burning.
“The staging equipment there will be huge,” he said.